An earlier article in this journal examined the implementation and operation of wage indexation in Australia from its inception in April 1975 Until June 1978 . (Plowman, 1978 . In that article it was argued that wage indexation could be regarded as having gone through three phases:
.... the early tentative trial period (April 1975 to May 1976 in which gaining acceptance and compliance were the Commission's major concerns; the period from May 1976 to June 1978 in which plateau and partial forms of indexation enhanced the deflationary attributes of indexation; and the period of review and transfor1nation following the June 1978 National Wage Case leading to different principles of wage dete1·1nination ... (Plowman, 1978, p. 1 09) .
At that time of writing, the June 1978 guidelines had not been announced and the paper concentrated on the first two phases. The first parts of this paper review the operation of indexation from June 1978 until its abandonment in July 1981. The sections after that examine wage determination in the period since July 1981. The final section of the paper discusses possible future wage policy options.
The Mark III Guidelines The guidelines implemented in June 1978 introduced three important changes to the then existing principles. First, quarterly indexation was replaced by a system of half-yearly indexation. Hearings were to be held in the months of April and October following the publication of the appropriate Consumer Price Index (CPI). Second, the Full Bench announced the abandonment of plateau indexation, which was the predominant form of indexation in Phase 11. This reflected growing concern with the compression of relativities resulting from plateau indexation. In using plateau indexation Full Benches attempted to reduce wages in a manner which would protect the incomes of lower wage earners. The distortion of established and jealously· guarded relativities was not conducive to industrial peace. The Mark Ill guidelines provided for uniform percentage increases -either full or partial . .
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The third change was the semi-pe1mane.aey afforded indexation. Up until June 1978, the Commission had refused to commit itlalf beyoad a quarter by quarter review of wage and price movements. The Mark m Guidelines wete to operate until the end of 1979, when they were to be reviewed. This semi-permanency no doubt relocted the Commission's greater confidence in the role of national wqe cases; the unexpected longevity of the indexation system; submissions by the major parties seeking continuance of a centralised system; and their inability to provide a viable alternative. In retrospect this confidence was not well based. By June 197~ the Commission was on the brink of abandoning indexation.
Three national wage cases were handed down under the Mark III guidelines: December 1978, June 1979, and January 1980. The result of these, and all the national wage cases held under wage indexation, are summarised in Table 1 . Mark III Guidelines (June 1978 -March 1980 1978 June/September Full4.0% 1979 December 1978/March Partial3.2% June/September Partia14.5% Mark IV Guidelines (March 1980 1980 December 1979/March Partia14.2% June/September Partia13.7%
Mark V Guidelines (April 1981 -July 1981 rease in the number of industrial disputes but also a wages drift-the difference between award and actual wages -of 2.5 percent. Employers had not been supportive of indexation and had not been prepared to resist wage increases outside the guidelines. In many instances they had entered into contrived arrangements for pay increases which they expected the Commission to endorse.
The Federal Government had not played the role expected of it by the Commission. Important supportive mechanisms, such as the Prices Justification Tribunal and tax indexation had been removed or made ineffectual. Income tax rates had been increased, thereby placing furtller pressures on wage demands. Government "policy induced" price rises had adversely affected the CPI and contributed an average some 2.25 percentage points to the Consumer Price Index ( CPI) for each of the years 1975 to 1979 (PlowJnan, 1982 The movement to petroleum import parity pricing, together with price ting from the September budget, contributed 1.9 percentage points out of the 2.3 percent CPI rise for the December 1978 quarter. 'The CPI was discounted for the effects of the import parity pricing of petroleum (i.e. 0.8 percent), and a conference called to decide the future of indexation. Unless some consensus could be achieved, the Bench considered ''there was little point in persisting with the indexation package" (NWC, June 1979, p.9) .
The conference did not produce consensus. Employers continued to aque that the wage-price nexus should be abandonned in favour of a productivity-geared sy tem. ' The ACTU called for full indexation with the right to bargain collectively. these polar positions, the Commonwealth Government's movement away from its advocacy of ''zero indexation" (a contradiction in tetins) may have been sufficient encouragement for the Commission to press on. The Government advocated a package which called for automatic six monthly indexation "for the CPI discounted for the effects of Commonwealth Government induced price rises". 'This package amounted to partial indexation of about 60 percent of the CPI movement.
This was not a particularly attractive offer to unions. Nonetheless, it narrowed the gap between the Commonwealth and ACTU submissions. Indexation limped on. Partial indexation of 4.5 percent was awarded in January 1980 following a 5.0 percent CPI incteue; petroleum import parity pricing again accounting for the discount. In March 1980 a fourth set of guidelines were introduced .
• The Mut IV Guidelines
The miQor a1nendments introduced in March 1980 concerned the CommUDity Catchup proriliODS (Principle 7b) Provision had existed in all sets of guidelines for work value changes under principle as ''changes in work value arising from changes in the nature of the work, sldll and responsibility required, or the conditions under which the work is performed" (NWC. March 1980, p. 38) .
Notwithstanding restrictions placed upon the use of principle 7(a), it was difficult to employ it in a way which did not upset established relativities. In June 1979 the Full Bench pointed out that:
Over the past twelve months, driver classifications under numerous awards .have received the same or similar increases, general increases have been granted to aircraft industry workers, airline transport workers, stevedoring industry, oil and paint industry employees ... It is clear that an ever increasing range of occupations in an ever widening range of industries is receiving increases which conform to a fairly standard pattern (NWC, June 1979, p. 3-4) . The genesis of this pattern of standard wage increases was the Transport Award Work Value Case, completed in December 1978, which awarded driver classifications wage increases of $8 per week. Despite the Commission's cautionary note that his case was not to establish a precedent for other transport awards, movements of identical or similar rates took place, initially in transport awards and then in other awards. By November 1979 the ''work value" wave had flowed through the transport, oil, aluminium, manufacturing, gas, aircraft, banking, vehicle assembling, liquor trades, building, metal trades, glass, stevedoring, dry cleaning and bread baking industries. By July 1980, some 34 per~ent of award wage and salary earners had received "work value" flow-ons. By April 1981, 80 percent of the workforce had received similar increases (NWC, April 1981, p.32) . A selective, micro avenue of wage adjustments had been converted into a general wage increase.
An important element in the awarding of generalised work value increases was the use of the "averaging" or "levelling down" process. The averaging process was one in which all award classifications were granted wage increases on account of work value changes experienced by some classifications in the award. The averaging process supposedly result in lower increases than ''justified" for some classifications and higher increases than '~ust ified" for others. And supposedly, the overall increase in the wages bill was equivalent to or not more than, that which would have been the case if only those "meriting" work value changes had received them. Given uniform rates of increase in various industries it became clear that the averaging process -which was contrary to the wording of Principle 7(a), which stated that work value changes would norn1ally apply to only some classifications within an award -had an eye to comparative wage justice rather than to wage costs.
The use of the averaging process is illustrated by the Metal Industry Work Value Case completed in November 1979 (Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, 1979) . Williams J. undertook the daunting task of inspecting an industry which contains in excess of 10,000 establishments, over 600,000 employees and an award with some 340 classifications, in just over two months. Thirty-eight companies were inspected an4 approximately one third of the award classifications evaluated. The inspections showed that some work value changes had occurred, but not in all areas:
In one or two of the smaller establishments inspected there has been little chanse in the nature of the work being performed by employees. On the other hand, in some of the large mass production shops there has been a substantial degree of investment in new machines and in changed methods of production which has led to a necessity for many employees to adjust to the new technologies and procedures involved . Under the Mark IV Guidelines, two national wage cues were heard, In July 1980, the .,.... handed down its decision in relation to the CPI for the December 1979 and March 1980 quarters. The Full Bench awarded an of 4.2 percent after dhcounting 0.6 percentage points on account of import petroleum parity pricing aad 0.5 pereeatqe points on account of the economic costs of industrial disputes and work value wage increases. The second case was completed in January 198l.It considered wage movements on account of CPI increases of 4.7 percent. The Full Bench again awarded partial iadexation by discounting the index 0. 7 percentage points for the direct effects of the government's on levy and by 0.3 percentage points on account of the indirect effects of thk policy. This was the fust occasion in which the Bench discounted for the indirect effects. It has overcome its previous aversion to "double counting" and the imposition of the total effects of the on levy on wage earners.
The 1981 Principles Review and the Mark V Guidelines
The January 1981 decision was of greater significance than the mere discountiq of the indirect effects of the oil levy. The decision also took note of the pressures upon indexation and contemplated bringing the system to an end. The Bench stated that ''the system in its present for1n had broken down ... (and) it would be idle to pretend otherwise". The level of industrial disputation, and output losses, had continued, in the FuJI Bench's view, at an unacceptably high level. In particular, industrial action in support of the 3 S hour week campaign was considered ''inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of the restraint inherent in the principles". Another important factor was the "stronsJy conflicting and iiieconcilable expectations among the major participants" and their 'ucompatible attitudes and expectations". Unions saw indexation as an effe ·ve base from which to launch other gains by way of direct negotiations. Employer organisations continued to press for the abandonment of the price-wage nexus and the adoption of some "capacity to pay" criterion that would have by-passed Principle I, which gave substance to the term ''indexation". The Commonwealth had only given lip service support to indexation and had argued the case for semi-automaticity at the wage-fixing principles conferences of 1978-9, It had then reverted to "zero indexation" submissions at national wage cases. The Bench decided to abandon the existing guidelines and call a conference to exam;ne the future of wage fiXation. Should the conference be unproductive, the Bench proposed conducting a public inquiry. The major issue of the conference wu to be the future of a centralised wage fixing system:
In essence, the issues to be resolved on the future of wage determination would be whether there should be a centralised system or not, what the character of the system should be and what principles if any should apply to each. Consideration related to a decentralised system would need to have regard to the question as to whether such a system should include periodic national wage adjustment and/ or deter1nination of a national wage case. (NWC, January 1981, p.6) . Following the failure of the conference to make satisfactory progress, the President of the Commission announced that a public inquiry would be held. On April 7, the Full Bench delivered its decision with respect to this inquiry. The decision was notable for three things: the continuance of a centralised system of waae determination in the form of indexation; an alteration in the way in which national wage adjustments were to take place; and a refusal to loosen the guidelines with respect to wage adjustments outside of those deterntined at national wage cases.
Despite its fear the wage indexation was breaking down, the Full Bench found that the major parties were unanimous in supporting the maintenance of a centralfsed system of wage deterntination "operating on a set of principles with national wage adjustments as the main source of wage increases". The parties differed over the fo1m of the centralised system and over the degree of centralisation. While the Full Bench welcomed this support, it was less certain of the support a centralised system would receive from employers and unions in the field 1 . The Bench indicated that if the tenets of its centraUsed system were not adhered to it would abandon wage indexation:
. . . we have given serious consideration to departing from the . . . system and reverting to the less structured arrangements which prevailed prior to 30 April 1975. The Commission should not try to operate a centralised system which is doomed to immediate failure ... We are encouraged by the unanimous support for an orderly centralised system but we are not convinced that there is sufficient recognition of the responsibilities such a system imposes on all participants involved in settlements at the establishment and industry level (NWC, Aprill981, p.8).
The Full Bench urged all the parties to show greater commitment and support than had been the case in the past. The Bench declared that "it is self-evident that there can be no coherent and meaningful centralised system unless the principles are generally complied with. We affirtn therefore that substantial compliance is the keystone of the package we propose." (NWC, April 1981, p.37) .
Since its inception, the indexation system reaffirtned the prices plus productivity forntula adopted in the 1961 National Wage Case. No productivity reviews, however, had been pursued. The April 1981 principles incorporated a time table for the hearing of any productivity case. A productivity hearing was to be processed at the second of two national wage cases. The first of these (the first review) was to be held following the publication of the March quarter CPl. At this review the Commission was to adjust award wages for 80 percent of the movement in the preceding December and March quarters CPI "other than in exceptional and compelling circumstances". One such fust review took place in May 1981 when the Full Bench granted a 3.6 percent wage increase on account of a CPI increase of 4.5 percent for the previous two quarters. The second case (the fmal review) was to be held following the publication of the September quarter CPI and was to consider award wage increases on account of three factors: the 20 percent residue from the first review; the CPI increases for the June and September quarters; and national productivity increases. It appears that the relevant productivity movements considered appropriate were those of the preceding year, rather than productivity movements not compensated for since the introduction of indexation (NWC, April 1982, pp. 26-27) .
The Full Bench concluded that ''there is agreement ... that productivity should be distributed nationally rather than on an industry basis" (NWC, April 1982. p.24 ) . While the parties to the Inquiry may have held this view, this appeared a sentiment not shared by employers and employees in productive industries. A weakness of the prices plus productivity formula, specifically, the productivity side of the fortnula, has been that parties at the sector, industry or enterprise level have not been prepared to wait for irregular and generalised productivity increases. The work value round, described earlier, with across-the-board wage increases, took on the characteristics of a decentralised productivity review. Productivity hearings in the final review may have been an attempt to create regular productivity adjustments, which, in turn, may have lessened wage pressures in the field.
In reformulating the principles, the Commission chose to toughen its stance in support of a centralised system, and to reject those elements of decentralisation which had been proposed or which had previously crept into the system. The Full Bench reaffumed that wage increases outside national wages cases must be kept to a minimum and declared:
1 Neither peak union councils nor peak employer bodies have power or authority over their affiliates.
The degree of de facto control that federal and state governments have over statutory authorities is also unclear.
• for For particular unions or workers taking part in protracted disputes, the Full Bench foreshadowed the witholding of national wage increases. The Bench stated that "the Principles must apply uniformly and consistently to all our awuds. Those who refuse to comply with the rules should not expect to receive the benefits which flow from the rules". (NWC, April1981, p.S8).
Post-Review Pressures and the Abandonment of Indexation
The April 1981 decision envisaged that the new principles would operate for two yean. The new guidelines came under such pressure, however, that the Commission &ban-donned them in July 1981. In the view of some, the new guidelines reflected too closely the system advanced by the federal government at the national wage conference. This made the new guidelines less acceptable to unions.
Indeed, the new guidelines did mirror rather closely the submissions made by the Commonwealth Government. The Full Bench's acceptance of these submissions, and its modelling of the new guidelines on those recommended by the Commonwealth, probably resulted from several factors. First, the Commonwealth's submissions were ex constructive. While the other major parties were prepared to reiterate polarised positions which had come to depict their attitudes under indexation, the Commonwealth wu prepared to make considerable concessions. Its acceptance of 80 percent automatic indexati at the first review was in sharp contrast to its espousal of "zero indexation" at previous national wage cases. The Commonwealth submissions took into account both the industria) relations and economic requirements of national wage determination. Earlier Government submissions had been sadly lacking in their appreciation of the first requirement. Secondly, the Government submissions did provide for a practical method of considerins both the industrial relations and economic attributes of indexation. A short fust review with near full indexation, followed by a second review in which more detailed submissions were made, added to the Commission's flexibility and ability to discount in in more acceptable manner. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Commission may have hoped to place more responsibility onto the Government for the effectiveness of indexation by adoptina its suggested foitnat. Since the election of the Fraser Government in 1975, the Commission and the Commonwealth found themselves on collision courses with respect to indexation. The Commonwealth line was that indexation maintained an artificiany high wage level which impeded the Government's strategy for economic recovery. The Commission complained that the emasculation by the Government of the indexation supporting mechanisms (particularly tax indexation, the Prices Justification Tribunal, "policy induced price rises", and "zero indexation") ha4 frustrated bldexattoa•s economic and industrial relations potential. Over the period 1975 -1980 the Commt•ion had become a useful scapegoat for the Government's inability to honour its election promise of "turning on the lights". Further, the Government had placed severe obstacles in the path of indexation which had contributed to the system beins bought to the b1lnk of abandonment. In opting for the Government's subJutsajon, the Commission may well have sought greater co-operation from the Government, and more specificaBy, may have sought to give the Government more autonomy and hence responsibility for wages policy. It is worth noting that the onlr post indexation national wage review of note also adopted the government's submission.
If the new guidelines, based upon Government submissions, were designed to secure greater Government co-operation and involvement, they were singularly unsuccessful:
Within a month of the new guidelines, the Federal Government announced its intention to conduct a wide-ranging jnquiry into wage deterJnination and industrial relations ... This followed on an even earlier decision to hire consultants to examine possible amendments to the Conciliation and Arbitration Act. Government support for the new guidelines thus appeared limited to their role as a further string in a wage restraint bow. Indeed, the extent to which the original atmosphere of indexation had been undermined by mid-1981 was reinforced by decisions of the Government's Razor Gang which reported in March. The Prices Justification Tribunal and policies of tax indexation were formally scrapped, only to be followed later in the year by the fmal abandonment of Medibank. If the growing trade union dissatisfaction with wage indexation had not been strong by mid-1980, decisions to abolish indexation's three original 'supporting mechanisms' could be almost guaranteed to spell the end of union reliance on indexation quidelines (Wright, 1982, p. 72) . Parliamentary salary increases, the 35 hour working week campaign, the independent action of two state industrial tribunals, and the impact of two major wage disputes, eventually brought about the collapse of indexation.
While arguing for wage restraint, including "zero indexation" for the majority of workers before the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, the Government took different action in relation to the salaries of members of parliament before the Renumeration Tribunal. The Government approved the 20 percent increase in the salaries of members of parliament (with higher increases for ministers) recommended by the Renumeration Tribunal in May 1981. Wage restraint, it seemed, did not apply to Canberra! A subsequent Cabinet decision to defer half the increases to a later date was a classic case of closing the gates after the horses had been stampeded out of the wages stable! The shorter working week campaign conducted by unions in a number of industries, principally the metal trades industry, put considerable pressure on the system of centralised wage determination. The indexation guidelines were adjusted in September 1978 to accommodate union pressure for a shorter working week. Principle 6 stated:
Each year the Commission will consider what increase in the total wage or changes in conditions of employment sliould be awarded nationally on account of productivity. The inclusion of the word "nationally" was to remove the growing trend to enterprise or industry-wide productivity bargaining. Such sectional bargaining was considered by the Full Bench as incompatible with the national system of adjustment in which equity was a paramount ~onsideration. At the national level, the ACTU could argue for reduced working hours on account of productivity. Union strategy, however, was a ''divide and conquer" one and sought to gain reduced working hours in select areas from which flow-ons could be subsequently secured. This resulted in considerable strike action which breached an important component of the substantial compliance requirement of indexation. principle of 80 percent indexation) to lower-paid workers. This decision created two problems: it generated relativity distortions between federal a~Jd state award employees (and it should be appreciated that employees under both sets of awards often work side by side in Australian enterprises), and it raised again the traumas associated with plateau indexation which the Federal Commission had been forced to abandon. Most importantly, it signalled the unwillingness of a state industrial tribunal to follow in the wake of a federal system patently in demise.
The guidelines adopted by the West Australian Industrial Commission were also sufficiently different as to be the cause of potential difficulties. In its guidelines the West Australian Commission accepted comparative wage justice as a basis for wage claims and also expressed a willingness to permit productivity bargaining over shorter working hours. The acceptance of comparative wage justice was a significant departure from the federal approach. Under its guidelines the federal Commission had rejected the relevance of comparative wage justice, rather derisively referred to as "that principle which means all things to all men", for wage adjustments under indexation. Again, the break of the West Australian Commission from the Federal Commission's wage principles probably reflected the fo11ner's assessment of the increasing impotence of the national guidelines. In addition to these actions by industrial tribunals, the New South Wales Government amended the Industrial Arbitration Act 1940 to remove any barriers to parties negotiating reduced working hours. Thus, this state government signalled its acceptance of productivity bargain-
Major wage disputes further heightened and aided the collapse of indexation. Two very important disputes in this respect concerned Telecom Australian and the Transport Worker's Union. In each case, management and the unions concerned were prepared to enter into agreements which breached the guidelines and then expect the Commission to certify the agreement. Certification, which has the effect of giving the agreement the same legal status as a deter1nination of the Commission, was an important factor in the transport dispute. Cartage contracts in this industry usually provide for rise and fall clauses in relation to wage increases approved by the Commissiolf. In the case of Telecom, Commission approval was a ploy to get the Government itself off the hook. In this case, management of the statutory authority negotiated an agreement with unions after severe industrial disruption. The basis of the union's claims was the loss of parity of technicians with those employed in the private sector. The Government agreed to sanction the increases but only so long as the Commission gave its consent. A Full Bench of the Commission, headed by the President, refused to ratify the agreement since it was in breach of the guideline. The Bench added, however, that it would be ''industrially naive" for Telecom not to pay the increases offered. The government was forced to agree to Telecom paying its 25,000 technicians increases ranging from SIS to $23 per week. As might have been expected, this induced relativity claims by other Telecom workers and by those employed by Australia Post, a statutory authority with established relativities with Telecom Australia.
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On top of this, the ACTU and public-sector unions initiated campaigns to increase the wages of some 400,000 public-sector employees to comparable rates of their private-eector counterparts. of decisions in the CommjMion, enancted, and statements by members of the Commission, unions and employer ". As a result, the public sector in Victoria had been served with a number of claims relating to wages, conditions and hours of work, and serious problems existed as to how such claims should be resolved. The Minister's letter continued:
Never before in the history of wage indexation have there been so many instances of non-compliance with the Commission's principles, although it is the understanding of the Victorian Government that all parties, including membem of the Commission are bound to observe those principles. In the Telecom the Commission indicated that it would be industriaJJy naive of the employer not to implement the agreement which had been reached. In the opinion of the Victorian Government, this is tantamount to the Commission acknowledging that relief, in the sense of resolution of claims which breach the guidelines, is now available to those parties which are prepared to negotiate without the Commissions's imprimatur.
Accordingly the expectations created by the Commission's comments on the Telecom settlement has been fueled by the unions demanding settlement of disputes outside the system. Thus the credibility of the Commission's principles is now being underntined.
If unions presist in seeking resolution of disputes in this way the State of Victoria faces industrial chaos by virtue of its commitment to the principles. The Government has supported the authority of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission and its centralised wage fiXation system. Clearly, however, the system has been imperilled by recent events.
The Victorian Government perceives a rapidly developing industrial vacuum and in the circumstances requests that the National Wage Case Bench reconvene as a matter of urgency to address itself to this most serious situation.' The National Wage Full Bench was reconvened in the context of thel Transport Workers' dispute. The Australian Road Transport Federation and the Transport Workers' Union agreed upon wage increases in the vicinity of $20 per week subject to ratification by the Commission. The Commission was not prepared to ratify the agreement and the union called a national stoppage. At the Conference, the govenment, which had been free in its criticism of the Commission's generous wage increases under the guidelines, now sought a relaxation of the guidelines in order to have the dispute settled quickly and enable the Prime Minister to attend an important overseas engagement -the royal wedding. The Commission rejected proposals by the ACTU and the Commonwealth that the strong pressures on the system could be accommodated by widening the Principles dealing with anomalies and inequities:
The beleif that the answer lies in greater tlexibBity of the kind proposed is illusory. Such flexibility would resolve sectional claims at the expense of national adjustments and destroy the priority expected of a centralised system. It cannot be otherwise (NWC, July 1981 ). Indexation was a ban donned on July 31st ushering in the government's prefe11ed option of a "policy of no policy". In the first round. As each set of negotiations have been undertaken in quite uu.lcr mnic circumstances, and have envolved different strategies, they have been out for the purpoaes of this paper.
The Government expectation was that the abandonment of indexation would result in market forces determining different rates of increases in different industries and between different occupations, and in a reduction in the rate of wage increases. This may well be the final outcome of that state which economists pursue but never seem to arrive at-the long run. Wage movements during the first wages round, that is for the first 18 months following the abandonment of indexation, indicate that the Treasury penpective has not been the short run outcome. Wage movements have spread uniformly throughout most federal and state awards based upon the standards established by the Metal Trades Industry Agreement negotiated in December 1981. Those agreements which had been negotiated prior to the metal agreement, and which did not give increases matching those of the metal agreement (for example, the $20 settlement in the transport dispute mentioned above) were re-opened and resulted in further compensation, often at the "mid-term" adjustment stage (see below). Other negotiations used the metal industry as the standard for negotiations and settled for comparable rates. The major factor differentiating award settlements related not so much to amount, as to the timing and method of settlement. Very depressed industries, such as the meat slaughtering and pastoral industries received their award adjustments eight to nine months after the metal industry agreement, and the settlements involved recourse to the Commission. In other industries (such as printing, pulp and paper and local government) flow-ons occured more quickly and by consent.
The metal industry agreement which became the benchmark for other settlements had four major components: an immediate pay increase of $25 per week in the fitter's rate and proportionate pay increases (11.9 percent) for other award classifications; a further mid-ter1n adjustment of $14 a week for fitters (5.7 percent) from July 1, 1982; a reduction in the standard working week from 40 hours to 38 hours, effective from March 1, 1982; and a "no further claims" clause for the period of agreement. Excluding the hourly rate increase resulting from reduced hourS', the 18.6 percent award wage increases for metal fitters in the 1 7 month period following the end of indexation compares with the 20 percent award wage increase (including an imputed 4 percent "work value" increase) in the last 25 months of indexation. If the hourly rate increase resulting from the shorter working week is included, award rate increases in the post indexation period to December 1982 were equivalent to increases gained under indexation in the period June 1978 to July 1981. The abandonment of indexation did not result in market forces determining different rates in different industries, so much as in fairly unifo11n wage movements based on criteria relevant to the metal industry settlement. In its Budget Statement No 2, the Treasury, no friend of either indexation or the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, sees these post indexation developments as short te1m phenomena:
After the abandonment of that framework in July 1981 (i.e. indexation) the working out of these (economic) pressures occulted largely through direct bargaining on a more decentralised industry and award basis. The development of such decentralised wage bargaining arrangement is still embryonic and it is probable that some of the wage pressure evident in 1981-82 was due to the transitional or hybrid nature of the arrangements then applying. In effect, we have been experiencing some of the costs usually associated with any "learning curve". But even the modest degree of liberation of wage setting from the shackles of the arbitral tribunals that has so far occurred appears to have moderated the speed of flow of wage increases and to have encouraged a greater sense of responsibility in industrial relations -as reflected, in a limited way, in the development of undertakings to make no further claims during the life of an agreement.
Over the long term (and subject to appropriate policy settings), the change to more decentralised wage deter1nination arrangements should work to make wage levels more responsive to economic conditions and capacity to pay at the industry level -and should thus promote higher employment and lower unemployment. Whereas the centralised wage indexation system tended to maintain real wage levels (for those still fortunate enough to be in jobs) in the face of weak activity and high levels of unemployment, the industry bargaining approach should allow greater scope for wage settlements to respond to the need to restore industry profitability and hence, maintain employment levels. Particularly to the extent that this were to happen in key areas such as the metals industry, it would facilitate a more rapid slowing down in inflation and speedier recovery in activity and employment. The extent of the increased flexibility in the wage system remains, however, to be seen . . . With the benefit of hindsight (the) bargaining process can be seen to be still far too ''centralised" (in this case, in the metal trades areas as a whole) to be able to take appropriate account of the interests of all units involved ... (Austra).ia, Department of the Treasury, 1982, p.52).
This Treasury interpretation is at variance with the statistical information supplied in Statement No.2 which shows an acceleration in earnings from 9.9 percent in 1970-80 and 13.5 percent in 1980-81 to 14.8 percent in 1981-82 (and, importantly , an increase in the annual rate from 13 percent in the first half of 1981-82 to 21 percent in the second half).
It also begs the question as to what effects the institutional factors in the labour market are likely to have on wage detettnination. All things being equal one can expect that the downturn in demand and increased economic recession can be expected to reduce wage gains in 1982-83. Whether the decentralised approach allows for greater scope for wage settlements to respond to the different needs of different industries depends on some of the other variables identified by the Treasury -the hybrid nature of arrangments (which, contrary to the Treasury view are not transitional but permanent arrangements), the appropriate policy settings, and the degree of flexibility (meaning decentralisation) which can be included in the ~ystem. The hybrid nature of the system, and the lack of genuine decentralisation, are likely to have an impact on the wage settlements currently being negotiated. Some of the factors relevant to the outcome of these negotiations are outlin, ed in the next section. The long term prospects for decentralisation or a return to centralised wage fixation will, I beleive, be determined at the political level. The final part of the paper discusses these prospects.
Wage Negotiations-Round Two
The parties move into the second round of negotiations with the same hybrid arrangements which operated in the earlier round and with an economy in much worse shape than that of a year ago. Important factors in the institutional arrangements include the provision for negotiated settlements as well as resort to arbitration where negotiations fail. Such arrangements, it may be argued, favour the institutionalisation of tlow-ons by way of comparative wage justice (Plowman, 1982, pp. 3843 ) . Thus, the benchmark role of the metal trades agreement will continue to exert an important influence as it did in round one. 8 "Decentralised" wage determination will continue to operate by way of awards covering large num hers of employees and significant proportions of industries. Thus the settlements will be arrived at having regard to macro or generalised solutions rather than solutions capable of taking account of more localised contingencies. Such settlements are accommodative of comparative wage justice pressures. Arbitrated settlements, giving primary consideration to the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes, rather than to the Treasury paradigm, will further facilitate award consistency by way of comparative wage justice. Thus, the critical factor in terms of the "community standards" for 1982-83 is likely to be the outcome of the metal trades agreement. Whether this outcome is the result of negotiations, or as the result of recourse to arbitration, may also have an important impact for any long term movement away from accommodative arbitration to a purer collective bargaining variant. 1978-1982 201 There iS' little doubt that the sudden downturn in the metal industry since February 1982 will influence the outcome of negotiations in two way. First, many employers in the industry associate the downturn with the generous provisions of the last agreement. These employers will force the Metal Trades Industry Association (MTIA) into a tougher negotiating stance with unions this time round. The second factor is the lack of capacity to pay. By December 1982, the MTIA estimates that between 50,000/60,000 metal workers (about 12 to 1 S percent of the industry's workforce) will have lost their jobs. Indications are that those industries upon which the metal trades are dependent -construction, automobile, white goods, iron and steel -are equally depressed and the estimated job loss may be conservative. Employers are bracing themselves for the largest downturn since the Depression of the 1930s. (Metal Trades Industry Association, 1982) It is in this context that the pre-negotiation shots have been fired. The MTIA has asked the unions to extend the existing award (i.e. to freeze wage increases) for a further six months. It has also demanded that unions take recent tax concessions (see next section) into account when negotiating claims. Many employers in the industry have been telexed and asked to "communicate to all employees with a view to getting everyone to go to the (union) meeting and ensuring that they understand the consequences for (sic) voting for the log of claims at this time". Employers have been urged by such telexes to inforn1 empployees of the level of retrenchments in the industry, the reduction in tariff protection, and "dramatic" rises in workers' compensation, payroll tax, electrical and fuel charges. Increased labour costs, the employers are urged to. make plain to employees, will increase job losses in the industry.
For its part the Amalgamated Metal Workers' and Shipwrights' Union (AMWSU) (the principal of the seven unions party to the award) has responded that the recession and its effects have taken place independently of wage movements and that a wages freeze will not materially alter employment prospects and structural changes over the next twelve months. A reduction in real wages, the union has claimed, will not guarantee no job loses. It has put forward a thirteen point log of claims which, in summary form, seeks:
1. Full maintenance of wages for CPI movements. 2. Increases in supplementary payments. 3. A nine day fortnight. 4. Payment of basic health cover. 5. Payment of double time for overtime after two hours. 6. Supply of boots and overalls. 7. Increase of sick leave to 10 days per year. 8. Adjustment of tool and other allowances with CPl. 9. Extension of holiday pay provisions. 1 0. Paid study leave for shop stewards. 11. Redundancy pay provisions. 12. Portability of long-service leave. 13. No further claims -with certain qualifications. A reasonable assessment is that the metal unions (and unions in general) will settle for the frrst point, the adjustment of awards rates for CPI movements. At a special conference on the economy in September ACTU affiliates resolved that their strategy for 1982-83 would be the maintenance of real wages rather than attempts to improve upon existing standards. The conference also endorsed the Executive's recommendations that the ACTU coordinate wage claims and the use of "increased collective action" in support of key industry unions involved in pacesetting negotiations for the next wages round (ACTU, 1982) . The industries nominated included the metal industry, building and construction, transport, waterfront and maritime industries, and storemen in key areas. The ACTU strategy includes the use of secondary boycotts, notwithstanding their illegality. On the historical evidence it is unlikely that unions will not acheive CPI adjustments. In only three of the years since the abandonment of automatic quarterly cost of livtng adjustments in 1953 have annual earnings increased by less than the CPl. Two of these years were in the indexation period. It is unlikely that the metal unions will have a resistance point in their negotiations below projected CPI movements. In the event of the MTIA refusing to agree to index wage adjustments a likely outcome will be recourse to arbitration.
9
This will result 9 The MTIA has publicly extolled the virtues of negotiated settlements since the December 1981 agreement. The praise has become more muted with the economic downturn and the impending round of negotiations.
202 David Plowman in the demise of the "modest degr, ee of liberation of wage setting from the shackles of arbitral tribunals" which the Treasury regards so highly. The Treasury index of a "greater sense of responsibility in industrial relations" -the no further claims clauses -will be another victim of arbitration, or of a negotiated settlement for less than CPI adjustments. Arguably, even CPI adjustments may be insufficient to enable the no further claims clause to be honoured in the more productive sectors of the economy . 1 0 ~hould unions be successful in having award rates adjusted for CPI movements, and should the Treasury CPI forcasts prove accurate, award increases of 10.75 percent may be expected.
The Politicising of Wage Deterntination
Political as well as economic uncertainty marks the future. Wage determination in the short tern1 is likely to be influenced more by the political and economic elements than by any actions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. The Commission will not return to a centralised national wages system without government submissions seeking that effect. The "policy of no policy" can be expected to remain the major thrust of the Coalition Government. This policy will be tempered by the requirements of a general election by the end of 1983. With the highest levels of unemployment since the Depression, the absence of any employment growth, high rates of interest and inflation, a projected mineral and resources boom which has stalled, and no other apparent investment, consumer or overs~as stimuli to economic recovery, the present government's political stocks are low and the Labor Party's prices and incomes approach a more acceptable alternative than might otherwise have been the case in different economic circumstances. The Government has publicly pursued an "inflation first'' economic strategy. Yet, for all the social and other losses associated with this strategy, inflation, projected at nearly 11 percent in 1982-83, will not be singularly better than when the Government took office eight years ago, and worse than the rate of inflation in many other OECD countries. Control of inflation will necessitate controls over wages and the Government's policy of decentralisation has not borne the expected fruit to date.
Until the handing down of the recent budget (August 17th) the major area differentiating the major political parties was their approach to wage control. The · Coalition has operated on the basis that the approach argued by the Treasury, the approach of decentralisation and de-institutionalising wage determination, would lead to a more "market based" outcome. With the abandonment of indexation the Government has attempted to influence wage settlements indirectly through monetary and fiscal measures . . It has not intervened in the industry-by-industry award settlements coming to the Commission for ratification or determination. This effectively removed intervention in "the public interest" and, arguably, aided the uniform flow-on of the metal industry agreement. This ineffectual permissiveness took place in the context of the then Minister for Industrial Relations (Mr Viner) publicly calling for an "Americanisation, of Australian collective bargaining. This "Americanisa tion '' was to be made more effective by a restructuring of unions. The Minister prevaricated between the preferred restructuring options -the West German industry model or the Japanese enterprise-based model. The "policy of no policy" had been transformed into a naive disregard of the institutional factors accompanying and influencing the wage determining process.
By way of contrast the post-indexation period has seen the Labor Party commit itself to economic recovery by way of an economic strategy having a prices and incomes policy at its core. Through the National Labor Advisory Council (NLAC), a joint ALP and ACTU body, and through other means, it has worked hard to secure ACTU endorsement and support for this policy. The Policy commits a Labor government to an extension of the
